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NEGLIGENCE-RES IPSA LOQUITUR-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be applied in medical malpractice cases.
Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital, 496 Pa. 465, 437 A.2d
1134 (1981).
Mary Belle Jones was suspected of having certain gynecological
problems by Dr. Charles R. Beittel, Jr. In order to diagnose her
condition and remedy any abnormality, Dr. Beittel operated on
Mrs. Jones on May 19, 1972 at the Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital.'
The surgery consisted of a D&C,2 a laparoscopy, 3 and a
laparotomy.
4
Dr. Beittel participated in all three procedures even though the
laparoscopy was primarily performed by a Dr. Rohrabaugh.5 Also
involved with Mrs. Jones' care in the operating room were Dr. Mi-
lan Chepko6 and Patricia McAloose.7
The three procedures required different positions on the operat-
ing table. During the D&C, Mrs. Jones was flat on her back with
her legs in stirrups. She was also flat on her back with her legs still
in stirrups and in the Trendelenberg position8 for the laparoscopy.
After the laparoscopy, Mrs. Jones' legs were removed from the stir-
rups and she was taken out of Trendelenberg position. At this
time, the operating table and the patient were parallel to the floor.
Subsequent to the incision for the laparotomy, Mary Jones again
was placed in Trendelenberg position to facilitate the examination
1. Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 496 Pa. 465, 467, 437 A.2d 1134, 1135 (1981).
2. Id. at 468, 437 A.2d at 1135. Dilation and curettage (D&C) involves the scraping of
the interior of the womb. Id. at 468 n.3, 437 A.2d at 1135 n.3.
3. Id. at 468, 437 A.2d at 1135. A laparoscopy is a method of abdominal examination
using a lighted tube inserted below the umbilicus. Id. at 468 n.4, 437 A.2d at 1135 n.4.
4. Id. at 468, 437 A.2d at 1135. A laparotomy is the surgical opening of the abdomen.
Id. at 468 n.5, 437 A.2d at 1135 n.5.
5. Id. at 468, 437 A.2d at 1135. Dr. Rohrabaugh was not named as a defendant. Id. at
468 n.6, 437 A.2d at 1135 n.6.
6. Id. at 468, 437 A.2d at 1135-36. Dr. Chepko was a resident physician who assisted
Dr. Beittel during the procedure. Id. at 468, 437 A.2d at 1136. He was subsequently dropped
from the suit. Id. at 468 n.7, 437 A.2d at 1136 n.7.
7. Id. at 468, 437 A.2d at 1136. McAloose was a nurse anesthetist who administered a
general anesthetic to the plaintiff Mary Belle Jones. Id.
8. Id. The Trendelenberg position is an angling of the body with the head lowered and
feet raised. Id.
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of her abdomen.9 During all three procedures, Mrs. Jones' arm, in
which an intravenous line had been placed, was on a board at-
tached to the operating table. 10
After recovering from the anesthetic, Mrs. Jones complained of
pain in her neck, shoulder, and arm." Prior to surgery, the plain-
tiff had had no history of neck, shoulder, or arm problems.12 Mrs.
Jones was diagnosed as having suprascapular nerve palsy, i3 which
was allegedly caused by improper positioning of her arm on the
arm board during surgery. 4
As a result of her injury, Mary Belle Jones and her husband
brought suit for medical malpractice against Dr. Beittel, Patricia
McAloose, and Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital.' 5 The plaintiffs
- sought recovery against defendant Beittel on the theories of lack of
informed consent and negligence, through the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur.' 6 Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital was
sought to be held liable solely on the basis of respondeat
superior. 
7
The jury found for the Joneses against all defendants and
awarded plaintiffs $56,000.1' Defendants McAloose and Harrisburg
Polyclinic Hospital, however, had entered into a joint tortfeasor re-
lease and settled for $25,000 prior to taking trial testimony.' 9 Dr.
Beittel filed post trial motions asking for a new trial, judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and a modification of the verdict
based on the joint tortfeasor release. 20 The lower court denied all
of the post trial motions.21 Dr Beittel then appealed, and the supe-
9. Id.
10. Id. at 468-69, 437 A.2d at 1136.





16. Id. Defendant McAloose was also sought to be held liable for negligence. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Plaintiff presented expert testimony at trial which indicated that Mrs. Jones'
injury was of a type that usually does not happen in the absence of negligence. Expert
,testimony also established that the injury most likely occurred in the operating room. Plain-
tiff's counsel on cross-examination was able to cause Dr. Beittel to admit that it was the
operating gynecologist's duty to preserve the patient neurologically throughout the proce-
dure. Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital, 269 Pa. Super. 373, 376-77, 410 A.2d 303, 305
(1979), rev'd, 496 Pa. 465, 437 A.2d 1134 (1981).
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rior court reversed, granting him a new trial.22 From this judgment,
cross appeals were taken by both the Joneses and Dr. Beittel.23
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered three is-
sues: first, whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied
in a medical malpractice case; second, if it is applicable in such
cases, whether the Joneses offered evidence sufficient as a matter
of law to support the verdict on the basis of res ipsa loquitur; and
third, whether the joint tortfeasor's release executed between the
Joneses and defendants McAloose and Polyclinic Hospital required
that the verdict against Dr. Beittel be reduced by two thirds rather
than one half, where the hospital's liability was predicated solely
on the basis of respondeat superior."
Justice Nix, writing for the majority,20 observed that in Gilbert
v. Korvette's, Inc., e the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had adopted
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 328 D27 formulation of
res ipsa loquitur."s He noted that section 328 D provides that neg-
ligence may be inferred where the event usually does not occur ab-
sent negligence, where other causes have been eliminated, and
where the negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to
the plaintiff."9
22. Id. In an opinion by Justice Price, the superior court stated that res ipsa loquitur
did apply in medical malpractice cases in Pennsylvania but that the Joneses had failed to
present evidence eliminating other responsible causes of the injury. Jones v. Harrisburg Pol-
yclinic Hosp., 269 Pa. Super. 373, 378-79, 410 A.2d 303, 306 (1979), rev'd, 496 Pa. 465, 437
A.2d 1134 (1981). See infra note 47.
23. 496 Pa. at 469, 437 A.2d at 1136. By agreement, the Joneses were designated ap-
pellants and Dr. Beittel, appellee. Id.
24. Id. at 470, 437 A.2d at 1136. See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
25. Justice Nix's majority opinion was joined in by Justices Larsen, Flaherty, and
Kaufmann. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Wilkinson joined.
Justice O'Brien took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 496 Pa. at 480, 437
A.2d at 1142.
26. 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1974).
27. RaTATEmRNr (SzcoND) or Towr § 328 D (1965). See infra note 29.
28. 496 Pa. at 470, 437 A.2d at 1136.
29. Id. at 470, 437 A.2d at 1136-37. Specifically, § 328 D provides:
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence of
the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of defendant's duty to the
plaintiff.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may reasonably
be drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be drawn in
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Justice Nix explained that under prior Pennsylvania law, there
existed three theories under which negligence could be inferred
from particular circumstances.3 0 By the adoption of the Restate-
ment view these' earlier theories, which had combined substantive
and procedural consideration with the evidentiary concerns associ-
ated with res ipsa loquitur, had been rejected in favor of a rule
which clearly identifies the evidentiary concerns that should be
considered when the doctrine is sought to be applied.31 Justice Nix
maintained that after Gilbert, res ipsa loquitur was viewed as
neither a rule of procedure nor a rule of substantive tort law, but
rather as a rule of evidence.
32
The court pointed out that prior to Gilbert, Pennsylvania courts
had suggested that theories of presumed negligence might not be
applicable in medical malpractice cases. 33 These earlier courts had
reasoned that the mere happening of an accident or an unfortunate
result was not enough to establish negligence on the part of a de-
fendant.34 The Jones majority noted that prior law did, however,
eliminate the need for expert testimony where medical negligence
was so obvious that it could be ascertained by a layman. 5
In considering whether res ipsa loquitur, specifically section 328
D, should be applied in medical malpractice cases, the majority
pointed out that courts in most jurisdictions recognize that the
doctrine does have its place in medical malpractice.30 The court
also noted that the "conspiracy of silence" among physicians,
which often hampered efforts to obtain expert testimony, created
D
any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D (1965).
30. 496 Pa. at 470 n.8, 437 A.2d at 1137 n.8. The three theories were res ipsa loquitur,
exclusive control, and an untitled simple circumstantial evidentiary theory. Id.
31. Id. at 470-71, 437 A.2d at 1137.
32. Id. at 471, 437 A.2d at 1137.
33. Id. See Nixon v. Pfahler, 279 Pa. 377, 124 A. 130 (1924); Stemons v. Turner, 274
Pa. 228, 117 A. 922 (1922). The belief was that the plaintiff should be required to prove by
expert testimony that the procedures employed were not in line with standard medical prac-
tice. 496 Pa. 471, 437 A.2d at 1137. See also Fala, The Law of Medical Malpractice in
Pennsylvania, 36 U. Pirr. L. REV. 203, 220 (1974).
34. 496 Pa. at 471, 437 A.2d at 1137.
35. Id. See Lambert v. Soltis, 422 Pa. 304, 308, 221 A.2d 173, 175 (1966); Demchuk v.
Brolow, 404 Pa. 100, 104, 170 A.2d 868, 871 (1961); Robinson v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 296, 127
A.2d 706, 710 (1956).
36. 496 Pa. at 471-72, 437 A.2d at 1137. Earlier it had been thought that the doctine
could have no place in medical science because so many intangibles and uncertainties were
involved that the occurrence of a bad result could never justify an inference of negligence,
and that all features of medical treatment could be interpreted and judged by physicians
only. Id. (quoting Fala, supra note 33, at 219).
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grave injustices in certain cases. 7 Section 328 D, the court stated,
was created to apply in all instances where negligence could be in-
ferred, whether involving a medical procedure or not." The section
was based on the premise that certain factual situations demand
an inference of negligence. e
The majority stated that it was satisfied that expert testimony
should no longer be a per se requirement in proof of negligence in
all cases of alleged malpractice.4 Expert testimony, explained Jus-
tice Nix, would only be necessary where there was no fund of com-
mon knowledge from which a layman could reasonably infer negli-
gence.4 ' Thus, the majority concluded, inferences of negligence
should be permitted either on the basis of common knowledge or
on the basis of expert testimony establishing that the unexpected
result was most likely the result of negligence.42 There no longer
need be a reluctance to permit circumstantial proof of negligence
where the reliability of inferences sought to be drawn is provided
by the nature of the evidence. 3
Justice Nix explained that this change in Pennsylvania law was
based on the recognition that the law must be responsive to new
conditions and to the persuasion of superior reasoning.44 He main-
tained that the need for an inference of negligence is especially ob-
vious in a situation where a plaintiff is rendered unconscious and
then receives injuries.45 In such a case, the plaintiff would be una-
ble to establish negligence without the application of res ipsa
loquitur. s
37. 496 Pa. at 472, 437 A.2d at 1138. The court pointed out that because of the con-
spiracy of silence among physicians, it was extremely difficult to get one physician to testily
as an expert against another. This created grave injustices where a patient lacked the requi-





42. Id. at 473, 437 A.2d at 1138.
43. Id.
44. 496 Pa. at 473, 437 A.2d at 1138 (quoting Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1,
23, 203 A.2d 796, 806 (1964). See B. CAiRozo, TImm NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 150-51
(1921).
45. 496 Pa. at 474, 437 A.2d at 1139.
46. Id.
[W]ithout the aid of the doctors a patient who received permanent injuries of a seri-
ous character, obviously the result of someone's negligence would be entirely unable
to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose
the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability.
Id. (quoting Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 154 P.2d 607, 689 (1944)).
1983
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After deciding that res ipsa loquitur does have application in
medical malpractice cases, the majority addressed the second issue
presented by the appeal: whether section 328 D of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts had been correctly applied in the instant case. It
was undisputed that sections (1)(a) and (1)(c) of section 328 D had
been satisfied. 7 However, Dr. Beittel had argued that the plaintiffs
had failed to present sufficient evidence to eliminate Dr.
Rohrabaugh as an "other responsible cause," thus failing to meet
the requirement of section 328 D(1)(b)." Justice Nix pointed out
that although Dr. Rohrabaugh had performed the laparoscopy, Dr.
Beittel had been present and had participated in the procedure.4 9
As a result, the majority concluded that Dr. Beittel and Dr.
Rohrabaugh shared joint responsibility for the positioning of the
patient, and therefore, each may be subject to liability.
5 0
In further support of his position, Dr. Beittel had argued that
the plaintiffs failure to join Dr. Rohrabaugh in their action pre-
cluded the application of section 328 D, citing the Minnesota case
of Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic.1 In Spannaus, the plaintiff
had failed to join the anesthesiologist in a malpractice suit for neck
damage sustained during vocal chord surgery. The Supreme Court
of Minnesota affirmed a judgment for the defendants, pointing out
that a requisite for application of res ipsa loquitur under Minne-
sota law is exclusive control by the defendant of the instrumental-
52Jutc Nity causing the damage. Justice Nix distinguished Spannaus,
concluding that the resemblances to the instant case were merely
superficial. Spannaus, explained Justice Nix, had been decided on
the basis of Minnesota's exclusive control doctrine without refer-
ence to section 328 D of the Restatement. 3
47. 496 Pa. at 474, 437 A.2d at 1139. See supra note 29. Justice Nix pointed out that
expert testimony to the effect suprascapular nerve palsy does not occur duing gynecological
surgery absent negligence was uncontradicted, thus satisfying the requirements of section
328 D(1)(a). Likewise, the defendant conceded section 328 D(1)(c) by not asserting that the
claimed negligence was beyond the scope of the duty to the plaintiff. 496 Pa. at 475, 437
A.2d at 1139.
48. Id. See supra note 29. Dr. Beittel argued that it was equally likely that the injury
had occurred during the laparoscopy procedure which Dr. Rohrabaugh had performed. 496
Pa. at 475, 437 A.2d at 1139.
49. 496 Pa. at 475, 437 A.2d at 1139.
50. Id. The court reasoned that where responsibility is vested in two or more parties,
each is subject to potential liability. Id. See Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 614-15,
327 A.2d 94, 110-11 (1974).
51. 397 Minn. 334, 242 N.W.2d 594 (1976).
52. Id. at 338, 242 N.W.2d at 597.
53. 496 Pa. at 476, 437 A.2d at 1140. The Minnesota exclusive control doctrine which
was applied in Spannaus, was found to be inapposite to the res ipsa loquitur rule which
Vol. 21:547
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Justice Nix explained that Dr. Beittel's argument, and the hold-
ing below in the superior court, were essentially that where another
party might be a responsible cause there is an insufficient elimina-
tion of a possible "other responsible cause" to comply with section
328 D(1)(b)5 4 However, Justice Nix maintained that to follow this
reasoning would be to preclude joint responsibility, a result con-
trary to both the holding in Gilbert and to the intent of section 328
D(1)(b). Justice Nix noted that Dr. Beittel had admitted that his
duty to monitor Mrs. Jones' position continued throughout the
laparoscopic procedure, including the time that Dr. Rohrabaugh
was working.5 6 He also pointed out that plaintiffs injured by joint
tortfeasors have the option of bringing an action against them ei-
ther jointly or individually, and that if Dr. Beittel believed that Dr.
Rohrabaugh was jointly responsible, Dr. Beittel could have joined
him as an additional defendant.
5 7
Because the evidence established that Dr. Beittel was a responsi-
ble cause of Mrs. Jones' injury, the majority concluded that section
328 D(1) had been satisfied. The majority further determined that
the lower court had correctly decided that an inference of negli-
gence could reasonably be drawn by the jury, and that the jury had
properly drawn such an inference.58
The final issue decided by the majority was the degree to which
the verdict should be reduced with regard to Dr. Beittel. Dr. Beit-
tel had argued that since there were two other joint tortfeasors, the
verdict should be reduced by two thirds instead of one half based
prevails in Pennsylvania. As Justice Nix noted for the majority in Jones, the exclusive con-
trol doctrine "in Pennsylvania has been termed 'a unique sibling of res ipsa loquitur' by Mr.
Justice Roberts in Gilbert v. Korvette's . . . . With the adoption of section 328 D in this
jurisdiction we need no longer be concerned with the technical differences between the for-
mer theories of res ipsa loquitur and 'exclusive control.'" 496 Pa. at 476 n.14, 437 A.2d at
1140 n.14 (citation omitted).
54. Id. See supra note 29.
55. 496 Pa. at 477, 437 A.2d at 1140.
He may be responsible, and the inference may be drawn against him, where he
shares control with another . . . . Exclusive control is merely one fact which estab-
lishes the responsiblity of the defendant; and if it can be established otherwise, ex-
clusive control is not essential to a res ipsa loquitur case. The essential question
becomes one of whether the probable cause is one which the defendant was under a
duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.
Id. 496 Pa. at 477 n.15, 437 P.2d at 1140 n.15 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
328 D, comment g (1965)) (emphasis added by Jones court).
56. 496 Pa. at 478, 437 A.2d at 1140-41.
57. Id. at 478, 437 A.2d at 1141. See 4A R. ANDERSON, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE §
2252.44 (1962).
58. 496 Pa. 478, 437 A.2d at 1141.
1983 553
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on the joint tortfeasor release." The majority disagreed. Justice
Nix explained that when contribution is made among joint
tortfeasors, a distinction should be made between primary and sec-
ondary tortfeasors.60 In this case, there were two individuals pri-
marily liable, Patricia McAloose and Dr. Beittel. The hospital was
charged with vicarious liability predicated on respondeat supe-
rior."' Justice Nix observed that in Parker v. Rodgers,6 2 the plain-
tiff had brought suit against two drivers, one of whom owned one
of the vehicles, and against the employer of the other driver. The
superior court had found that when an employer is held liable
solely on the basis of respondeat superior, the employer's share in
contribution is identical to the employee's.03 The majority also
noted that in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Philadelphia
Electric Co.,64 a federal district court applying Pennsylvania law
had adopted the rationale of the Parker court.6 5 Justice Nix noted
that Parker preceded the Pennsylvania Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasor's Act,66 but concluded that the rationale of
Parker was consistent with the statute's purpose and continued to
represent Pennsylvania law.
e7
Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion stating that in his
view, the sole dispute in Jones was whether the plaintiff had suffi-
ciently eliminated other responsible causes.6 8 Justice Roberts
noted that Dr. Beittel had actively participated throughout the op-
eration and thus, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that
59. Id.
60. Id. at 478-79, 437 A.2d at 1141.
61. Id. at 479, 437 A.2d at 1141.
62. 125 Pa. Super. 48, 189 A. 693 (1937).
63. Id. at 53, 189 A. at 696. In Parker, plaintiff brought an action against Rodgers,
Glenzinger, and Pough. Rodgers owned and operated one automobile. Glenzinger drove the
other automobile owned by Mrs. Pough. Plaintiff's damages were the result of a collision
between these two automobiles. The superior court maintained that since Rodgers and
Glenzinger were primarily concerned in the tort and Mr. Pough's involvement was vicarious,
Rodgers and Pough together should only be responsible for one half of the damages. Id. at
49-54, 189 A. at 693-96.
64. 443 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
65. Id. at 1146-47. "However, this is a suit for contribution and it is not the total
number of defendants involved who could have been liable to the deceased's estate but the
number of directly and primarily liable parties which determines the number of pro-rata
shares." Id. at 1146.
66. 496 Pa. at 480, 437 A.2d at 1142. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2082-89 (Purdon 1951).
67. 496 Pa. at 480, 437 A.2d at 1142. See Russell v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 353
(M.D. Pa. 1953).
68. 496 Pa. at 480-81, 437 A.2d at 1142 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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Dr. Beittel was at all times the "responsible cause" of the injury. 9
Res ipsa loquitur, which translates from Latin as "the thing
speaks for itself," developed from a casual remark uttered in an
1863 case. 70 The case involved a barrel of flour which had rolled
out of a warehouse window and fallen on a passing pedestrian.
7 1
Initially, the principle of res ipsa loquitur merely permitted the
reasonable conclusion that an unusual accident was most likely the
defendant's fault." For instance, it might be reasonable to assume
that a barrel falling from a building was the result of the negli-
gence of someone in the building. Later, res ipsa loquitur became
intermingled with an older principle, which had placed the burden
of proving absence of negligence on common carriers in cases of
injuries to passengers. 3 Thus, these two principles, one involving
sufficiency of evidence and the other the burden of proof, became
intertwined. 4
Wigmore eliminated some of the confusion in res ipsa loquitur
law by outlining in his treatise on evidence 7 5 three conditions nec-
essary for the application of the doctrine. These conditions were:
first, the event must have been of a type which would not ordina-
rily occur in the absence of someone's negligence; second, the event
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
defendant's exclusive control; and third, the event must not have
been caused by the plaintiff's voluntary action or contribution.
76
In 1965, the American Law Institute formalized the require-
ments for the application of res ipsa loquitur. The American Law
Institute's view differs from Wigmore's view in two respects. First,
Wigmore required the defendant to have exclusive control over the
instrumentality, while the Restatement looks only for a duty from
defendant to plaintiff.77 The second difference relates to treatment
of the concept of "other responsible causes." Under the Restate-
ment view, the conduct of plaintiff and of third persons should be
sufficiently eliminated by the evidence as causes of the unfortunate
result. Wigmore, however, only required the elimination of the con-
69. Id. at 481, 437 A.2d at 1142 (Roberts, J., concurring).
70. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 213 (4th ed. 1971).
71. Id. See Byrne v. Boadle, 149 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
72. W. PROSSER, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. J. WIGMoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940).
76. Id. § 2509.
77. See supra note 29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D (1965).
1983 555
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duct of the plaintiff.
Recently, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has found increasing
application in medical malpractice cases. The courts of many
American juristictions have manifested an awareness of a need to
protect patients by requiring physicians to explain injuries.7" The
New Jersey Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a long judicial his-
tory of applying res ipsa loquitur in a medical malpractice context
in its decision in Buckelew v. Grossbard.79 In Buckelew, plaintiff, a
registered nurse, brought an action for malpractice against her sur-
geon for bladder injuries which had occurred during an exploratory
laparotomy. The superior court entered a judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict for the physician and the appellate division af-
firmed.80 One of the crucial issues .on appeal to the supreme court
was whether common knowledge alone must determine the
probability of the occurrence being the result negligence.8 1 Justice
Clifford, writing the majority opinion, stated that expert testimony
to the effect that the medical community recognizes that an event
does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence may afford a
sufficient basis for the application of res ipsa loquitur.82
The Illinois Supreme Court took an expansive view of the scope
of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice in its decision in
Walker v. Rumer.83 In Walker, the court decided that the
probability of an occurrence being the result of negligence could be
established by either common knowledge or expert testimony.8,4
Shortly after the Walker decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois
clarified the amount and quality of evidence required to prove the
probability element of res ipsa loquitur in Spidle v. Steward.
5
Judith Spidle and her husband brought an action in medical mal-
78. See Cho v. Kempler, 177 Cal. App. 2d 342, 2 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1960); Klein v. Ar-
nold, 203 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
79. 87 N.J. 512, 435 A.2d 1150 (1981). See also Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 140,
167 A.2d 625, 631 (1961) ("where, for example, a surgical sponge is left inside a patient after
an operation, it is reasonable to say the probability is that someone has been negligent");
Magner v. Beth Israel Hosp., 120 N.J. Super. 529, 295 A.2d 363 (App. Div. 1972); Terhune v.
Margaret Hague Maternity Hosp., 63 N.J. Super. 106, 164 A.2d 75 (App. Div. 1960).
80. 87 N.J. 512, 516-23, 435 A.2d 1150, 1152-55.
81. Id. at 527, 435 A.2d at 1158.
82. Id. The court declined to decide whether expert testimony, without regard to what
is a "given" in the medical community, was sufficient to establish that certain events were
more likely than not the result of negligence. Id.
83. 72 Ill. 2d 495, 381 N.E.2d 689 (1978).
84. Id. at 501, 381 N.E.2d at 691. Walker was decided on the pleadings.
85. 79 II. 2d 1, 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980).
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practice for injuries suffered after a laparotomy. 6 The Illinois Ap-
pellate Court affirmed a verdict for the defendant, recognizing that
expert testimony may establish the probability element of res ipsa
loquitur but reasoning that expert testimony had only established
the rarity of plaintiff's injury.8 7 The Illinois Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the combination of expert testimony of an un-
usual occurrence and specific acts of negligence would lead a rea-
sonable person to believe that the patient's injury was likely the
result of negligence.88
Although res ipsa loquitur has found increasing application in
cases of medical negligence, some jurisdictions have refused to ap-
ply the doctrine in malpractice cases, while others have applied it
only very cautiously. For example, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas, interpreting Texas law, refused
to apply res ipsa loquitur in Shevak v. United States.89 The dis-
trict court pointed out that Texas law imposes an affirmative duty
on the plaintiff to prove that the doctor's negligence was the cause
of the injury and presumes that a physician performed his work
properly.90
Of those courts which do employ the doctrine, some refuse to
apply it where the only ground to do so is that a rare result has
occurred. 9' The courts reason that this would place too great a bur-
den on the medical profession and might result in an undesirable
limitation on the use of procedures with inherent risks.92 For ex-
ample, in Hyder v. Weilbaecher, 3 the court held that a surgeon is
86. Id. at 5, 402 N.E.2d at 217.
87. Spidle v. Steward, 68 Ill. App. 3d 134, 140, 385 N.E.2d 401, 406 (1979), rev'd, 79
Ill. 2d 1, 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980).
88. 79 Ill. 2d at 9-10, 402 N.E.2d at 220. Expert testimony established here that plain-
tiff's injury was rare and that defendant operated at the wrong time. See also Van Zee v.
Sioux Valley Hosp., 315 N.W.2d 489 (S.D. 1982), in which the plaintiff was permitted a jury
instruction on res ipsa loquitur when three out of four experts had opined that defendant's
action had not caused plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court of South Dakota reasoned that
the one favorable testimony "pierced the shroud of silence that often surrounds the testi-
mony of physicians who are hesitant to testify against another member of the medical pro-
fession." Id. at 494.
89. 528 F. Supp. 427 (1981).
90. Id. at 531.
91. See, e.g., Belshaw v. Feinstein, 258 Cal. App. 2d 711, 65 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1968);
Wickoff v. James, 149 Cal. App. 2d 664, 324 P.2d 661 (1958).
92. See, e.g., Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 22 Cal. Rptr. 337, 372 P.2d 97 (1962)
(the fact that a fistula is an unusual complication following a hysterectomy does not estab-
lish that the surgeon was negligent; an inference of negligence would place too great a bur-
den on use of operations and new procedures).
93. 54 N.C. App. 287, 283 S.E.2d 426 (1981).
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not ordinarily an insurer of success, and in medical malpractice
cases there is generally no presumption of negligence in the failure
to successfully effect a remedy."'
Pennsylvania certainly has not been spared the confusion which
resulted from the intermingling of res ipsa loquitur as a principle
of circumstantial evidence and the older precedent allocating the
burden of proof in common carrier cases. This confusion lead
Pennsylvania courts to restrict the use of res ipsa loquitur to cases
in which the defendant owed the plaintiff the highest degree of
care. 95 This class of defendants included owners and operators of
common carriers, elevators, escalators, and suppliers of electrical
power.9a Having limited res ipsa loquitur to a small group of defen-
dants, Pennsylvania courts began to utilize two other doctrines of
circumstantial proof. These doctrines were "exclusive control
9 7
and an untitled evidentiary rule of simple circumstantial
evidence.98
In 1974, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court significantly changed
res ipsa loquitur law by its decision in Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc.9e
Gilbert involved an action brought against a department store
(Korvette's) and an escalator manufacturer (Otis) for injuries sus-
tained by a child when his foot became caught in an escalator. The
jury was instructed on res ipsa loquitur and verdicts against both
defendants were returned. 100 The Pennsylvania Superior Court af-
firmed the verdict as to Korvette's because Korvette's was the
94. Id. at 288, 283 S.E.2d at 427.
95. Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 606, 327 A.2d 94, 97 (1974). See Alexander
v. Nanticoke Light Co., 209 Pa. 571, 58 A. 1068 (1904) (patron of electric company was
shocked; presumption that company was negligent and res ipsa loquitur applied).
96. 457 Pa. at 606-07, 327 A.2d at 97.
97. Id. at 607-08, 327 A.2d at 98. The exclusive control doctrine raised an inference of
negligence and shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
The doctrine should be applied only where all of the following elements are present:
(a) where the thing which caused the accident is under the exclusive control of or was
made or manufactured by the defendant; and (b) the accident or injury would ordina-
rily not happen if the defendant exercised due care, or made or manufactured the
article with due care; and (c) where the evidence of the cause of the injury or accident
is not equally available to both parties, but is exclusively accessible to and within the
possession of the defendant; and (d) the accident itself is very unusual or exceptional
and the likelihood of harm to plaintiff or one of his class could reasonably have been
foreseen and prevented by the exercise of due care; and (e) the general principles of
negligence have not theretofore been applied to such facts.
Izzi v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 412 Pa. 559, 566, 195 A.2d 784, 788 (1963).
98. 457 Pa. at 609, 327 A.2d at 98.
99. 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1975).
100. Id. at 604, 327 A.2d at 96.
Vol. 21:547
Recent Decisions
owner of a common carrier and owed the "highest degree of care."
Otis was awarded a new trial because Otis did not owe the "highest
degree of care," and therefore, a res ipsa loquitur instruction was
improper.'"' The supreme court granted an appeal limited to a de-
termination of whether the case against Otis was properly
presented to the jury on res ipsa loquitur instructions.'
0 2
Justice Roberts, expressing the opinion of the court in Gilbert,
carefully analyzed the state of res ipsa loquitur in Pennsylvania.
He pointed out the confusion present in Pennsylvania law due to
the intermingling of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of circumstantial
evidence and the determination of the duty owed by defendant to
plaintiff.10 3 Justice Roberts mentioned a sibling of res ipsa loquitur
termed "exclusive control" which had appeared in Pennsylvania.
In cases employing the exclusive control formulation, the courts
were unable to fully recognize that circumstantial evidence may be
adequate to establish negligence. 1' Justice Roberts also noted that
exclusive control, a theory similar to res ipsa loquitur, had been
very narrowly applied in Pennsylvania. 05 According to Justice
Roberts, Pennsylvania found itself with three companion doctrines
- res ipsa loquitur, exclusive control, and an evidentiary rule of
simple circumstantial evidence.106
The Gilbert court attempted to displace the confusion generated
by the three doctrines with a single doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Res ipsa loquitur, held the Gilbert court, henceforth would not be
associated with questions of duty but would only be a shorthand
expression for circumstantial proof of negligence.10 7 The single doc-
trine accepted by the supreme court in Gilbert was section 328 D
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 08 As pointed out by Justice
Roberts, the Restatement rule eliminates any requirement of ex-
clusive control. The critical question under the Restatement is,
"who is the responsible cause?" Responsibility can be shared, with
each of several parties potentially subject to liability under the Re-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 604-07, 327 A.2d at 96-98.
104. Id. at 608, 327 A.2d at 98.
105. Id. at 608-09, 327 A.2d at 98.
106. Id. at 609, 327 A.2d at 98.
107. Id. at 611, 327 A.2d at 99.
108. Id. at 612, 327 A.2d at 100. The Gilbert majority was convinced that the Restate-
ment rule was "a far more realistic, logical, and orderly approach to circumstantial proof of





Thus, the Gilbert decision set the stage in Pennsylvania for a
change in medical malpractice law. Prior to Gilbert, Pennsylvania
courts had been steadfast in refusing to infer negligence from the
mere happening of an unexpected result."1 This refusal was reaf-
firmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as late as 1966.111 The
only exception to this otherwise invariable rule was in cases where
the matter under investigation was so simple and the lack yf skill
or want of care so obvious as to be within the range of the ordinary
experience and comprehension of even non-professional persons. 1 2
Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hospital represents the final step
in the transition of res ipsa loquitur law in medical malpractice in
Pennsylvania. In Jones, the court has permitted an inference of
negligence even where expert testimony was necessary to establish
that an event would not ordinarily occur absent negligence.11 3 The
decision is an expansion of prior law which permitted a res ipsa
loquitur inference only where negligence could be inferred as a
matter of common knowledge. 4 Thus, section 328 D permits the
inference of negligence in two situations: first, where it is obvious
to the layman that the event would not occur absent negligence,
which is analogous to the previous standard of common knowledge
as the basis of the inference; and second, where medical knowledge
is relied upon to establish that the event would not occur absent
negligence. 11 5 The second situation represents the area of expan-
sion of the doctrine with regard to medical malpractice.
Unfortunately, the factual situation in Jones raises some
109. Id. at 614, 327 A.2d at 101.
110. See Stemons v. Turner, 274 Pa. 228, 117 A. 922 (1922). In Stemons, the trial
judge had instructed the jury "that it was the duty of defendants to use a 'high' degree of
care." Defendant was an osteopathic physician who had injured the plaintiff during the use
of an x-ray. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the trial judge's instructions to be in
error. The court reiterated the rule laid down by prior cases holding defendants to ordinary
standard of care and refused to apply res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 228, 117 A. at 922.
111. See Lambert v. Soltis, 422 Pa. 304, 221 A.2d 173 (1966). Plaintiff, here, instituted
suit against her dentist for pain and loss of teeth. She alleged that this resulted from failure
to take x-rays and improper injection of local anesthesia. Plaintiff had failed to offer medi-
cal evidence of negligence on defendant's part, but relied on an unfortunate result as cir-
cumstantial proof of negligence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's
judgment of non-suit.
112. See, e.g., Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963) (elderly patient fell and
had obvious symptoms of fractured hip - physician who saw patient failed to treat); Davis
v. Kerr, 239 Pa. 351, 86 A. 1007 (1913) (gauze pad left in patient's body).
113. 496 Pa. at 472-73, 437 A.2d at 1138.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 41 and 42.
115. See 496 Pa. 473, 437 A.2d at 1138.
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problems as to whether the case was an appropriate vehicle in
which to make this change in the law. Mrs. Jones' nerve injury,
upon which her cause of action was based, was unrelated to the
part of her body for which she sought treatment. Thus, the injury
in Jones arugably fell within the old "common knowledge" area
under which prior Pennsylvania law permitted res ipsa loquitur in-
structions. Because the injury occurred to a completely separate
part of the plaintiff's body, the jury might have been able to infer
negligence on the basis of its own common knowledge. Neverthe-
less, expert testimony was offered to the effect that suprascapular
nerve palsy does not ordinarily occur during gynecological surgery
in the absence of negligence.11 6 Although the Jones court applied
the second category of section 328 D and permitted an inference
based upon medical testimony, this inference was arguably unnec-
essary to the decision and could constitute dicta.
117
In addition, even if expert testimony was necessary in Jones to
establish that the nerve palsy was most likely due to negligence,
under the Jones facts an expert could easily infer negligence.
There are circumstances, however, where an expert would be
placed in a more precarious position. For example, if the post-op-
erative complication had been a cardiac arrest and Mrs. Jones had
a previous heart ailment, it would be very difficult for any expert
to say with certainty whether the complication was related to the
disease or to a negligently administered anesthetic.1 Thus, it is
very easy to imagine expert witnesses being faced with increasingly
difficult decisions under this liberalization of the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.
The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Jones is the
logical conclusion of a gradual change in Pennsylvania law. How-
ever, the decision does present the possibility of many potential
problems for both the legal and the medical professions. It allows
application of res ipsa loquitur in areas where it has never before
been permitted. Yet, Justice Nix's opinion gives little guidance in
the application of the doctrine, particularly in the more difficult
cases.
In addition, the liberalization of the doctrine may affect the
116. See id. at 475, 437 A.2d at 1139.
117. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
118. Any expert witness would be hard put to give an accurate estimate of the mortal-
ity and morbidity associated with a general anesthetic for a healthy individual in Pennsylva-
nia in 1982. Personal conversation with Dr. E.S. Siker, President of the American Board of
Anesthesiology (Sept. 7, 1982).
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manner in which medicine is practiced.1 9 The result may be an
increasingly defensive practice of medicine, in which physicians be-
come insurers of success and carry the burden of proving absence
of negligence. 12 0 One method by which a physician might seek to
establish absence of negligence or to support a diagnosis is to ob-
tain otherwise unnecessary laboratory tests. Patients will thus be
forced to undergo the burdens of time, cost, and risk associated
with such tests. The decision in Jones, while meeting a need for an
inference of negligence in cases where the plaintiff is unable to es-
tablish medical malpractice by direct proof,' may nevertheless
have a negative effect on society in the form of increased medical
care costs.
Daniel Sullivan
119. See Note, "Conditional" Res Ipsa Loquitur in Illinois Medical Malpractice Law:
Proof of a Rare Occurrence as a Basis for Liability - Spidle v. Steward, 30 DE PAUL L.
REV. 413, 436 (1981); See also HEW, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 155 app. (1973). Liberalization of res ipsa loquitur
resulted in large number of decisions for plaintiffs in appeal cases in California. Id. at 142
app.
120. See Note, supra note 119, at 437.
121. 496 Pa. at 474, 437 A.2d at 1139.
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